By Ahmad Suaedy*
Speaking about Islamic movements and thought can not really be separated from observations of current political powers and momentums, both on the national and the local scale. 2008 is a year in which the political process is incredibly intensive in facing the most crucial moment of Indonesia’s journey to democracy, namely the parliamentary and presidential elections, both of which are to be held in 2009.

The result of these two general elections, if they can, and hopefully do, actually happen, will determine not only the direction and model of democracy that has been built since the fall of the New Order, but also the philosophical orientation and the meaning of freedom for the people of Indonesia themselves. The struggle and competition is really a struggle between Islamic powers themselves; and there is no political struggle or competition which fails to incorporate Islamic elements.

Thus, Islam is now in the middle of the competitive arena itself, whether as an action or ideological base, therefore being offered as an alternative to the type of state and society currently in place; whether as a political commodity aimed at power and attainment of universal support; or whether as an ideal ambition which dreams of an ideal form of authentic integration of Islam and Indonesians.

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Mark Woodward (2001), for example, categorized the Islamic response to the post New Order changes into five groups. Woodward’s categorization views things from the point of doctrine and social roots within the Muslim society of Indonesia, both old and new.

First, indigenized Islam. Indigenized Islam is an expression of Islam with local characteristics: formally they claim to be Muslim, but they usually follow local rituals rather than orthodox Islam. This characteristic parallels with what Clifford Geertz calls ‘abangan’ Islam in the Javanese context. In religious and political relations, it is given that they think secularly and are reluctant to bring religious issues to the realm of the state, and vice versa.

Second, the traditional Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). NU is the largest Sunni adherent in Indonesia and is considered to have individual expression, because it has special features not possessed by other groups, including a strong base in pesantren and villages, a unique teacher-student relationship, and characteristic of strong accommodation for local Islamic expression so long as it does not conflict with Islamic belief. NU apparently does not try to force “Arabism” into everyday Islamic life.

Third, modern Islam. This Islam is mostly based on Muhammadiyah, the second largest organization after Nahdlatul Ulama. It is based on social service such as education and health care. It introduces ideas of modernization into classical understandings. It, for example, rejects local expression and is more likely to embrace puritanical expressions which feature “Arabism”.

Fourth, Islamism. This movement has recently only brought Arabism and conservatism, but also contains within it the paradigm of Arab-Islam ideology. It is no surprise that jihad and the application of Islamic law are a primary characteristic of this group. This group has also not been shy in forming paramilitary Islamic ranks to oppose anyone or thing identified as an enemy of Islam by their definition.

Fifth, neo-modern Islam. This group is characterized more by intellectual movement and critique of established Islamic doctrine. It originates from a variety of groups, including both traditional and modern circles. Members are found within a variety of NGOs and research institutions, Islamic universities and certain traditional Muslim leaders. They also search for new interpretations of various Islamic doctrines based on social realities, and use new methods and philosophies such as hermeneutics.

Meanwhile, Peter G Riddel (2002) divides post New Order Islamic groups into four categories: modernist, traditionalist, neo-modernist, and Islamist. Generally speaking, Riddel agrees with each of the above definitions but ignores one of Woodward’s categories – indigenized Islam. For Riddel, each possess their own unique characteristics in dealing with crucial issues in the initial years after the first general elections (1999) following the fall of the New Order. These issues include returning to the Jakarta Charter, the Malacca crisis, opening trade relations with Israel, an Indonesian federation, the place of minorities in the Indonesian state system, female presidents, and newly formed political parties.

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Despite the difference in categories of these two academics, I agree that there are four Islamic bases of power in the lead up to the 2009 elections, which are representative of Islamic thought and movements. Although comprehensively explaining each of these powers is quite a complicated process, I wish to give a basic understanding by examining the central symbols and primary characteristics of thought, movement and idealization as well as the supporters of these groups.

First, the power of Megawati with her party – the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). PDI-P is considered a nationalist party which, under the traditional political map of the Old and New Orders, was in confrontation with Islamic politics and parties. I believe PDI-P can no longer be seen as a nationalist party vis a vis Islam. PDI-P, with Megawati as its symbol, is a party supported by a large number of Muslims.

In terms of PDI-P’s Islamic characteristics, they hold that Islam is not a basis for action and they virtually have no Islamic intellectual basis. It is a given that they believe religion is separate from politics. This understanding comes not only from western secular understandings, but also from Indonesian, particularly Javanese, culture itself - what Woodward calls indigenized Islam.

Yet arguably this group will experience difficulties in responding to the demands of other Islamic groups, supposing they demand something specific, because PDI-P does not have an intellectual Islamic basis with which to respond. Thus, this group is more likely to use their power to answer such demands, than argumentative reasoning. Consequently, they will rely on the power of negotiation. If negotiation fails and their power is upset, then they will choose to maintain their power by accommodating the demands, no matter what the principals of the demands may be.

Second, Golkar. We do not yet know who is the central figure of this party, who has roots extending back to Soeharto’s regime. Yet we can expect that Golkar’s presidential candidate will come from a modern or modernist form of Islam – from the last academic category. Pragmatism is its trait. Whatever the majority demands are from Golkar’s members or society, they will become the reference upon which decisions are made, so long as the party continues to obtain or maintain power.

This party has many intellectuals, including Muslim intellectuals, but its orientation is highly dependent on its grip on power. This can be seen in its orientations which differ from one region to another, depending on the demands of the local Muslim majority. Thus, similar to the first group, negotiation is the primary weapon of this party, even in the most important of matters.

Third, Gus Dur’s party. From the point of view of the party, Gus Dur’s party is not as big as the two parties above. However support for his thought and actions is spread across almost every group and power, except for those groups which are truly Islamist and which reject ideas of pluralism and diversity, and are against tolerance.

Many people acknowledge the truth behind Gus Dur’s thoughts and actions, although there are also many who are scared and worried about following his ideals because he often ignores material and political profits, and does not care about his self image for the sake of maintaining his principles. These characteristics have, besides a high intellectual Islamic basis, a very strong principal of ‘Indonesian-ness’. Without meaning to exaggerate, it is perhaps this tradition, taken from the history of his thoughts and actions, which is most authentic in Indonesian Islam. It is based on the archipelago’s traditional Islamic views, which has, since early Islamic history, been well known as a tradition that continues to develop and adapt.

In the hands of this group, Islam continues to develop without leaving its intrinsic and original values. This group has difficulty compromising on Indonesia-Islam issues: there is, within it, elements of respect for traditions both present and developing within society, as well as for intrinsic citizenship rights, such as the right to have a religion or faith, and the right to lead a reasonably comfortable life. This group is characteristically very ideal, yet has difficulty winning in a time which is highly pragmatic and full of short cuts.

In terms of economy, if we may reflect on Gus Dur’s presidency, Gus Dur was perhaps not an anti neo-liberal man, but rather tended to want to build new economic powers, such as the India-China-Indonesia axis for the independence of the people in these countries, without creating an excessively strained situation.

Fourth, SBY’s party. Because SBY is currently in power, it is easer to examine him. From his actions as president it can easily be seen that in terms of religion he represents the right, or the Islamist stream, and is the most transparent neoliberal agent in terms of economics. There is no truth to the fact that SBY religiously follows the anti-tolerance and anti-pluralism MUI stream, or to the fact that he appointed KH Ma’ruf Amin, the most vocal anti-pluralism and anti-deviant sects spokesperson, as member of the Presidential Advisory Council for the field of religion.

The Ahmadiyah case and the bloody Monas Tragedy show the stance from which SBY’s policies are derived. The Three Ministers’ Joint Decree on Ahmadiyah, for example, was issued when the presidential palace was surrounded by supporters of Rizieq Shihab, the general head of FPI, which is against pluralism and tolerance.  It could be said that in this case, SBY bent under the demands of Rizieq and Munarman (Commander of the Islamic Brigade Command). This occurred because SBY’s initial circle of power consisted of Islamic parties such as PKS, PBB, and PD. These two former parties are known as militant Islamic parties, while PD does not have enough intellectual power to contest the other two parties.

During SBY’s government, on the other hand, in terms of the economy, while figures show that the macro economy is quite stable because it is supported by provisional international funds, the national economic foundation has collapsed. Look no further than the decrease in petroleum produce, electricity supplies, gas supplies, cooking oil and refined oil within the country. Never before have people been seen lining up for food, refined oil, and cooking oil, or with such poor nutrition as they now are. Yet at the same time, a minister, also an entrepreneur in collaboration with SBY, became the richest man in Southeast Asia for the first time in Indonesian history.

Consequently, inter-religious violence which has never been handled normally, as well as care for and protection of Islamist groups, in practice, I believe, represents this governments’ strategy to squeeze support from the Islamists for the 2009 elections. Similarly, the short tense periods that deviant sects, including Ahmadiyah, experience, are for no purpose other than to milk Islamic sentiment for the same reason. Thus SBY, with the power of his supporters, is a representation of right-winged Islam. So do not be surprised if the tension is nurtured until the 2009 general elections.

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Considering this matter, there are several issues to reflect on. First, the spreading government interference in inter-religious relations which is a part of their strategy to gain support. It is estimated that this phenomena will continue to develop, to its complete infiltration of laws, and government regulations, at the local and central levels. I hope it does not touch the constitution, although this can not be disregarded as a possibility. Its culmination will be the domination of specific groups, and discrimination of other groups, at the most fundamental level: the constitution and the law.

Second, poverty and queues. These two words will continue to be reciprocally connected for as long as there is no significant change in economic strategy, and other words may be added, such as death, and poor nutrition. Foreign control of natural resources will be directly followed by efficiency through mechanical regeneration, to the neglect of the human workforce. What then occurs is widespread unemployment. The progression is easy to predict: poverty, queuing, poor nutrition and even death.

Third, control of natural resources. It seems that right from the beginning the economic orientation of this government has followed the major world economic trend - neoliberalism. At some future point in time Indonesia may not have any natural resources under their own management, but rather all will be “given” to foreign capital, with long contracts and efficient management to quickly reel in profits.

Fourth, Islamist movements. The current government, especially SBY, is not just suspected of having a strong understanding in line with Islamist understandings and also with the primary parties mentioned above, but he also does not have sufficient understanding of Islam and Islamic movements. So that anything that benefits him, he will take, even concerning principal rights such as the right to religion and faith. If there is no courage to change this current government orientation towards Islamist movements, then these movements will only further permeate state and government bodies.

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I will not suggest that PMII follow a certain trend, or even create a new one. But considering PMII’s commitment to the people as an organization based on grassroots trends, and PMII’s Indonesia-Islam vision, perhaps this has to become a major consideration. It seems that only with this method will Indonesian Islam exist to face the future.
Thank you.

Kampung Rambutan, July 13, 2008.

*The author is the Executive Director of the Wahid Institute.
** This working paper was submitted in the Advanced Cadre Training for the Indonesian Islamic Student Movement (PKL-PMII) in Pondok Cabe, Cireundeu, Tangerang, Banten, Sunday, July 13, 2008.

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